The importance of compensating strategic network board members for network performance

A contingency approach

Sara Thorgren, Joakim Wincent, Sergey Anokhin

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

13 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Firms in government-supported strategic networks tend to rely on professional network board members for support and assistance. As such, two significant issues arise: should board members be compensated and under which circumstances is compensation more - or less - effective for network performance. Based on yearly panel data from 53 government-supported strategic networks of small- and medium-sized enterprises over a five-year period, this study examines the effects of compensating network board members. Advocating for a contingency approach, we combine the agency and stewardship literatures to posit that the effects of compensation are moderated by contingency factors that stimulate either an agency or stewardship relationship between the network board and the networking firms. Our findings indicate that significant funding, network firms represented on the network board, and top-down network formation stimulate board members to become agents rather than stewards. This therefore explains the higher effect of board member compensation under such conditions.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)131-151
Number of pages21
JournalBritish Journal of Management
Volume21
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Mar 2010
Externally publishedYes

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Network performance
Compensation and Redress
Contingency approach
Strategic networks
Industry

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business, Management and Accounting(all)
  • Strategy and Management
  • Management of Technology and Innovation

Cite this

The importance of compensating strategic network board members for network performance : A contingency approach. / Thorgren, Sara; Wincent, Joakim; Anokhin, Sergey.

In: British Journal of Management, Vol. 21, No. 1, 01.03.2010, p. 131-151.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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