Abstract
Firms in government-supported strategic networks tend to rely on professional network board members for support and assistance. As such, two significant issues arise: should board members be compensated and under which circumstances is compensation more - or less - effective for network performance. Based on yearly panel data from 53 government-supported strategic networks of small- and medium-sized enterprises over a five-year period, this study examines the effects of compensating network board members. Advocating for a contingency approach, we combine the agency and stewardship literatures to posit that the effects of compensation are moderated by contingency factors that stimulate either an agency or stewardship relationship between the network board and the networking firms. Our findings indicate that significant funding, network firms represented on the network board, and top-down network formation stimulate board members to become agents rather than stewards. This therefore explains the higher effect of board member compensation under such conditions.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 131-151 |
| Number of pages | 21 |
| Journal | British Journal of Management |
| Volume | 21 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Mar 2010 |
| Externally published | Yes |
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ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Business, Management and Accounting(all)
- Strategy and Management
- Management of Technology and Innovation
Cite this
The importance of compensating strategic network board members for network performance : A contingency approach. / Thorgren, Sara; Wincent, Joakim; Anokhin, Sergey.
In: British Journal of Management, Vol. 21, No. 1, 01.03.2010, p. 131-151.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - The importance of compensating strategic network board members for network performance
T2 - A contingency approach
AU - Thorgren, Sara
AU - Wincent, Joakim
AU - Anokhin, Sergey
PY - 2010/3/1
Y1 - 2010/3/1
N2 - Firms in government-supported strategic networks tend to rely on professional network board members for support and assistance. As such, two significant issues arise: should board members be compensated and under which circumstances is compensation more - or less - effective for network performance. Based on yearly panel data from 53 government-supported strategic networks of small- and medium-sized enterprises over a five-year period, this study examines the effects of compensating network board members. Advocating for a contingency approach, we combine the agency and stewardship literatures to posit that the effects of compensation are moderated by contingency factors that stimulate either an agency or stewardship relationship between the network board and the networking firms. Our findings indicate that significant funding, network firms represented on the network board, and top-down network formation stimulate board members to become agents rather than stewards. This therefore explains the higher effect of board member compensation under such conditions.
AB - Firms in government-supported strategic networks tend to rely on professional network board members for support and assistance. As such, two significant issues arise: should board members be compensated and under which circumstances is compensation more - or less - effective for network performance. Based on yearly panel data from 53 government-supported strategic networks of small- and medium-sized enterprises over a five-year period, this study examines the effects of compensating network board members. Advocating for a contingency approach, we combine the agency and stewardship literatures to posit that the effects of compensation are moderated by contingency factors that stimulate either an agency or stewardship relationship between the network board and the networking firms. Our findings indicate that significant funding, network firms represented on the network board, and top-down network formation stimulate board members to become agents rather than stewards. This therefore explains the higher effect of board member compensation under such conditions.
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U2 - 10.1111/j.1467-8551.2009.00674.x
DO - 10.1111/j.1467-8551.2009.00674.x
M3 - Article
VL - 21
SP - 131
EP - 151
JO - British Journal of Management
JF - British Journal of Management
SN - 1045-3172
IS - 1
ER -