Entrepreneurship, innovation, and corruption

Sergey Anokhin, William S. Schulze

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

177 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Efforts to control corruption increase levels of trust in the ability of the state and market institutions to reliably and impartially enforce law and the rules of trade. Such trust facilitates the development of arms-length trade and the coordination of complex economic activities. We posit that better control of corruption will also be associated with rising levels of innovation and entrepreneurship. Absent such trust, however, monitoring and other transactions cost should restrict the scale and scope of trade and thus, hamper productivity and investment in innovation and entrepreneurship. Longitudinal data from 64 nations lends support to our propositions, thus helping unpack the puzzling relationship between entrepreneurship, innovation, and corruption.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)465-476
Number of pages12
JournalJournal of Business Venturing
Volume24
Issue number5
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Sep 2009
Externally publishedYes

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Innovation
Productivity
Economics
Monitoring
Entrepreneurship
Corruption
Costs
Transaction costs
Longitudinal data
Economic activity
Markets and institutions

Keywords

  • Control of corruption
  • Entrepreneurship
  • Innovation

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business and International Management
  • Management of Technology and Innovation

Cite this

Entrepreneurship, innovation, and corruption. / Anokhin, Sergey; Schulze, William S.

In: Journal of Business Venturing, Vol. 24, No. 5, 01.09.2009, p. 465-476.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Anokhin, Sergey ; Schulze, William S. / Entrepreneurship, innovation, and corruption. In: Journal of Business Venturing. 2009 ; Vol. 24, No. 5. pp. 465-476.
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