Abstract
As a promising wireless network virtualization technology, virtualized base station (BS) has been proposed to tackle the problem of low-efficient utilization of BS's computing resources, e.g., baseband processing units (BPU). In this paper, we design a novel scheme to achieve the efficient BPU allocation based on a contract-theoretic approach. To achieve this, we consider the BPUs as a kind of trading resources. We establish a monopoly market, where the infrastructure provider (InP) is the monopolist owning all the BPUs, and multiple mobile network operators (MNOs) intend to rent BPUs from the InP for processing their baseband signals. In such a market, the InP offers a set of quantity-price contract items to the MNOs based on statistical information of their types, and at the same time, the MNOs are stimulated to accept the offers for the purpose of making profit. We propose the optimal contract design to maximize the InP's profit, as well as develop an incentive mechanism to guarantee each MNO choosing a proper contract item. Numerical results validate the effectiveness of our incentive mechanism for BPU resource allocation.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | 2018 IEEE 88th Vehicular Technology Conference, VTC-Fall 2018 - Proceedings |
| Publisher | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9781538663585 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 12 Apr 2019 |
| Event | 88th IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference, VTC-Fall 2018 - Chicago, United States Duration: 27 Aug 2018 → 30 Aug 2018 |
Publication series
| Name | IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference |
|---|---|
| Volume | 2018-August |
| ISSN (Print) | 1550-2252 |
Conference
| Conference | 88th IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference, VTC-Fall 2018 |
|---|---|
| Country | United States |
| City | Chicago |
| Period | 27.8.18 → 30.8.18 |
Fingerprint
Keywords
- cellular networks
- contract theory
- incentive mechanism
- resource trading
- Virtualized base station
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Computer Science Applications
- Electrical and Electronic Engineering
- Applied Mathematics
Cite this
Contract-Based Trading on Parallel Computing Resources for Cellular Networks with Virtualized Base Stations. / Gao, Mingjin; Shen, Rujing; Li, Jun; Li, Yonghui; Shi, Jinglin; Javakodv, Dushantha Nalin K.
2018 IEEE 88th Vehicular Technology Conference, VTC-Fall 2018 - Proceedings. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2019. 8690991 (IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference; Vol. 2018-August).Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution
}
TY - GEN
T1 - Contract-Based Trading on Parallel Computing Resources for Cellular Networks with Virtualized Base Stations
AU - Gao, Mingjin
AU - Shen, Rujing
AU - Li, Jun
AU - Li, Yonghui
AU - Shi, Jinglin
AU - Javakodv, Dushantha Nalin K.
PY - 2019/4/12
Y1 - 2019/4/12
N2 - As a promising wireless network virtualization technology, virtualized base station (BS) has been proposed to tackle the problem of low-efficient utilization of BS's computing resources, e.g., baseband processing units (BPU). In this paper, we design a novel scheme to achieve the efficient BPU allocation based on a contract-theoretic approach. To achieve this, we consider the BPUs as a kind of trading resources. We establish a monopoly market, where the infrastructure provider (InP) is the monopolist owning all the BPUs, and multiple mobile network operators (MNOs) intend to rent BPUs from the InP for processing their baseband signals. In such a market, the InP offers a set of quantity-price contract items to the MNOs based on statistical information of their types, and at the same time, the MNOs are stimulated to accept the offers for the purpose of making profit. We propose the optimal contract design to maximize the InP's profit, as well as develop an incentive mechanism to guarantee each MNO choosing a proper contract item. Numerical results validate the effectiveness of our incentive mechanism for BPU resource allocation.
AB - As a promising wireless network virtualization technology, virtualized base station (BS) has been proposed to tackle the problem of low-efficient utilization of BS's computing resources, e.g., baseband processing units (BPU). In this paper, we design a novel scheme to achieve the efficient BPU allocation based on a contract-theoretic approach. To achieve this, we consider the BPUs as a kind of trading resources. We establish a monopoly market, where the infrastructure provider (InP) is the monopolist owning all the BPUs, and multiple mobile network operators (MNOs) intend to rent BPUs from the InP for processing their baseband signals. In such a market, the InP offers a set of quantity-price contract items to the MNOs based on statistical information of their types, and at the same time, the MNOs are stimulated to accept the offers for the purpose of making profit. We propose the optimal contract design to maximize the InP's profit, as well as develop an incentive mechanism to guarantee each MNO choosing a proper contract item. Numerical results validate the effectiveness of our incentive mechanism for BPU resource allocation.
KW - cellular networks
KW - contract theory
KW - incentive mechanism
KW - resource trading
KW - Virtualized base station
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85064898775&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85064898775&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/VTCFall.2018.8690991
DO - 10.1109/VTCFall.2018.8690991
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85064898775
T3 - IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference
BT - 2018 IEEE 88th Vehicular Technology Conference, VTC-Fall 2018 - Proceedings
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
ER -