Contract-Based Trading on Parallel Computing Resources for Cellular Networks with Virtualized Base Stations

Mingjin Gao, Rujing Shen, Jun Li, Yonghui Li, Jinglin Shi, Dushantha Nalin K. Javakodv

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

As a promising wireless network virtualization technology, virtualized base station (BS) has been proposed to tackle the problem of low-efficient utilization of BS's computing resources, e.g., baseband processing units (BPU). In this paper, we design a novel scheme to achieve the efficient BPU allocation based on a contract-theoretic approach. To achieve this, we consider the BPUs as a kind of trading resources. We establish a monopoly market, where the infrastructure provider (InP) is the monopolist owning all the BPUs, and multiple mobile network operators (MNOs) intend to rent BPUs from the InP for processing their baseband signals. In such a market, the InP offers a set of quantity-price contract items to the MNOs based on statistical information of their types, and at the same time, the MNOs are stimulated to accept the offers for the purpose of making profit. We propose the optimal contract design to maximize the InP's profit, as well as develop an incentive mechanism to guarantee each MNO choosing a proper contract item. Numerical results validate the effectiveness of our incentive mechanism for BPU resource allocation.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2018 IEEE 88th Vehicular Technology Conference, VTC-Fall 2018 - Proceedings
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
ISBN (Electronic)9781538663585
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 12 Apr 2019
Event88th IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference, VTC-Fall 2018 - Chicago, United States
Duration: 27 Aug 201830 Aug 2018

Publication series

NameIEEE Vehicular Technology Conference
Volume2018-August
ISSN (Print)1550-2252

Conference

Conference88th IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference, VTC-Fall 2018
CountryUnited States
CityChicago
Period27.8.1830.8.18

Fingerprint

Mobile Networks
Parallel processing systems
Parallel Computing
Cellular Networks
Base stations
Wireless networks
Incentive Mechanism
Resources
Infrastructure
Operator
Unit
Profit
Processing
Profitability
Virtualization
Resource Allocation
Wireless Networks
Maximise
Resource allocation
Numerical Results

Keywords

  • cellular networks
  • contract theory
  • incentive mechanism
  • resource trading
  • Virtualized base station

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Science Applications
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering
  • Applied Mathematics

Cite this

Gao, M., Shen, R., Li, J., Li, Y., Shi, J., & Javakodv, D. N. K. (2019). Contract-Based Trading on Parallel Computing Resources for Cellular Networks with Virtualized Base Stations. In 2018 IEEE 88th Vehicular Technology Conference, VTC-Fall 2018 - Proceedings [8690991] (IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference; Vol. 2018-August). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/VTCFall.2018.8690991

Contract-Based Trading on Parallel Computing Resources for Cellular Networks with Virtualized Base Stations. / Gao, Mingjin; Shen, Rujing; Li, Jun; Li, Yonghui; Shi, Jinglin; Javakodv, Dushantha Nalin K.

2018 IEEE 88th Vehicular Technology Conference, VTC-Fall 2018 - Proceedings. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2019. 8690991 (IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference; Vol. 2018-August).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Gao, M, Shen, R, Li, J, Li, Y, Shi, J & Javakodv, DNK 2019, Contract-Based Trading on Parallel Computing Resources for Cellular Networks with Virtualized Base Stations. in 2018 IEEE 88th Vehicular Technology Conference, VTC-Fall 2018 - Proceedings., 8690991, IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference, vol. 2018-August, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 88th IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference, VTC-Fall 2018, Chicago, United States, 27.8.18. https://doi.org/10.1109/VTCFall.2018.8690991
Gao M, Shen R, Li J, Li Y, Shi J, Javakodv DNK. Contract-Based Trading on Parallel Computing Resources for Cellular Networks with Virtualized Base Stations. In 2018 IEEE 88th Vehicular Technology Conference, VTC-Fall 2018 - Proceedings. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2019. 8690991. (IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference). https://doi.org/10.1109/VTCFall.2018.8690991
Gao, Mingjin ; Shen, Rujing ; Li, Jun ; Li, Yonghui ; Shi, Jinglin ; Javakodv, Dushantha Nalin K. / Contract-Based Trading on Parallel Computing Resources for Cellular Networks with Virtualized Base Stations. 2018 IEEE 88th Vehicular Technology Conference, VTC-Fall 2018 - Proceedings. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2019. (IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference).
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